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COMMENTS
BUYER'S REMEDIES FOR A DEFECTIVE
AUTOMOBILE: THE U.C.C. VERSUS THE
OKLAHOMA LEMON LAW
I. INTRODUCTION*
Americans spent $65.2 billion on the purchase of new automobiles
in 1983.1 The average consumer expenditure per new automobile was
$10,586.2 The automobile is a necessity of life; mass transportation in
many areas of the country is inadequate and national policies and stan-
dards of living encourage individually-owned modes of transportation.'
Both economically and practically, the automobile is a major consumer
purchase. The average buyer, however, purchases the automobile in rei-
ance on information from the manufacturer and dealer. Even owners
who plan to perform minor routine maintenance on their automobiles
may not be trained to inspect them before the purchase. The intricacy of
* The author thanks Professor Martin A. Frey for reading the manuscript and offering useful
suggestions.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACt OF THE
UNITED STATES 587 (1985). This Comment will not treat remedies for a used automobile which is
defective. Although theoretically possible, the remedies to be discussed are more difficult to justify
for a defective used automobile, primarily because of the time elapsed. Rejection must occur within
a reasonable time of delivery or tender, see infra notes 22-23, and revocation must occur before the
automobile shows substantial changenot due to the alleged defect, see infra notes 45 and 89. Suit for
breach of warranty requires proof of a warranty on the used automobile and proof that the defect
resulted from factory error. See infra note 133. The Lemon Law remedies are available for the
shorter of one year from original delivery or the period of the warranty. See infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
2. Letter to Recipients of MOTOR VEICLE FACTS AND FIGURES '84 from Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. (Aug. 31, 1984) (data from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, Table 23 Average Transaction Price Per New Car).
3. According to the Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n,
Private transportation continues to hold its own as the principal means for Americans
to travel to work or play.
U.S. Federal Highway Administration data for 1977 show that the car, station wagon,
van or pickup were used for more than 83 percent of all trips. By comparison, public
transportation modes were used for just 3 percent.
Of the motor vehicle trips, nearly a third of them were related to earning a living.
Family and personal business trips accounted for another third of the trips.
MOTOR VEmCLE FACTS AND FIGURES '84, at 40 (1984) (data from UNrrED STATES FEDERAL
HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION 1977 PERSONAL TRANSPORTATION STUDY - (1977).
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an automobile, the difficulty of inspecting it without dismantling it, and
the great potential for latent defects militate against anything but the
most cursory inspection before driving away from the dealership.
The dealer and manufacturer profit from satisfied customers. Yet
the latent nature of many defects makes it difficult to prove the seller's
responsibility for correcting the defect. Moreover, automobile dealers
are to some extent justifiably reluctant to take back a "lemon." 4 The
buyer's case against the corporate seller may be time-consuming, difficult
to prove, and expensive in relation to the total value of the automobile
and the potential damage award.
This Comment will discuss and evaluate the remedies available
under Oklahoma law to the buyer of a lemon. Revocation of acceptance
under Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) section 2-6085 will be ex-
amined within the context of other remedies which include rejection
under U.C.C. section 2-601,6 damages for breach of warranty under the
U.C.C.,7 and suit for refund or replacement of the automobile under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act.' These options will be compared with respect to problems of proof
and the adequacy of the buyer's remedy. Finally, these traditional reme-
dies will be compared with the Oklahoma Lemon Law which now pro-
vides for refund or replacement of a defective automobile covered by an
express warranty.9
II. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE BUYER OF A
DEFECTIVE AUTOMOBILE
Because an automobile is within the U.C.C. definition of "goods," 10
article 2 applies to the sale of an automobile as a "transaction in
4. R. BILLINGS, HANDLING AUToMOBILE WARRANTY AND REPOsSESSIoN CASES § 5.1
(1984).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 45-125.
6. OKLA. STAT. tit 12A, § 2-601 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 19-44.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 126-36.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 137-49.
9. The Oklahoma Legislature passed a lemon law during the first session of the 40th Legisla-
ture. Act of July 15, 1985, 1985 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1201-02 (West) (to be codified at OKLA.
STAT. tit. 15, § 901) (effective Nov. 1, 1985). The text of the Act appears in APPENDIX A. See infra
text accompanying notes 150-210. Two previous lemon law bills, H.R. 1502, 39th Leg., 2d Sess.
(1984) and S. 140, 39th Leg., Ist Sess. (1983), had been defeated. Citations to lemon laws in force in
other states appear in ApPENDix B.
10. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (as adopted at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-105(1) (1981)) provides in part,
"'[goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action."
1985]
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goods."" This section will define the requirements of three remedies
under article 2-rejection,12 revocation of acceptance, 13 damages for
breach of warranty14 --and remedies under the Magnuson-Moss Act."
Resort to these statutory remedies is not automatic since remedy for
nonconformity in an automobile is generally provided through the manu-
facturer's standard limited and exclusive warranty to repair or replace
defective parts. 6 Contractual exclusion of other remedies is permitted
under U.C.C. section 2-719 which states in part that "the agreement may
11. OKiLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-102 (1981).
12. Id. §§ 2-601 to 2-605 (1981) (buyer's rights on improper delivery, buyer's obligations, effect
of rejection).
13. Id § 2-608 (1981) (circumstances permitting revocation, buyer's obligation).
14. Id § 2-607 (1981) (buyer's obligation to notify seller of breach); id § 2-714 (1981) (measure
of damages for breach of warranty).
15. For further analysis of these traditional remedies and their relation to the lemon laws, see
generally R. BILLiNGs, supra note 4, §§ 4.1-4.22, 5.1-5.52, 6.8-6.30, 7.1-7.56; Note, The Connecticut
Lemon Law, 5 U. BRIGEPORT L. Rnv. 175 (1983); Note, Lemon Lawv" Putting the Squeeze on
Automobile Manufacturers, 61 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1125 (1984); Minnesota DevelopmentA Sour Note: A
Look at the Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 MINN. L. REv. 846 (1984).
16. 1. BiiNGS, supra note 4, §§ 6.1, 6.8. The standard warranty also excludes incidental and
consequential damages, covers only certain parts, is of limited duration, and disclaims implied war-
ranties. The U.C.C. recognizes an implied warranty of merchantability in § 2-314, OKLA. STAT. tit.
12A, § 2-314 (1981), and an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in § 2-315, Id § 2-
315 (1981). The following provisions, taken from the 1985 New Car Limited Warranty distributed
by American Honda Motor Co., are typical:
Some states have recently passed laws which give new-car buyers certain rights. Although
these laws vary from state to state, they generally say that if a new car has a major defect
(e.g., one that substantially affects its use, value, safety) which can't be repaired in a reason-
able time (generally four attempts to repair the same problem, or out of service at various
times for a total of 30 days), the owner can request a replacement or a refund. Usually, the
defect must occur within the first year.
Before maling the request, you must explain the problem in writing to our Zone Customer
Service office and give the dealer and American Honda an opportunity to resolve it. If we
aren't successful, we'll ask you to submit the dispute to Auto Line for mediation or
arbitration.
Of course there are other terms and conditions in these laws. We recommend you check
your own state law if the need arises. Our intent is for you to be satisfied with your Honda.
If you have any questions or problems, please contact your local Honda dealer first, then
the Zone Customer Service office.
Time and Mileage Period
This warranty begins on the date the car is sold to the first retail purchaser, or the date it is
first used as a demonstrator, lease, or company car, whichever comes first. The car is
covered for 12 months or 12,000 miles (or a maximum of 18 months or 18,000 miles under
a demonstrator warranty extension), whichever comes first. The power train (described
below) is covered for 24 months or 24,000 miles (whichever comes first) from the date the
warranty begins.
Warranty Coverage
Honda will repair or replace, at its option, any factory-installed part that is defective in
material or factory workmanship under normal use. Normal use excludes any use the
Owner's Manual states is not recommended. Warranty repairs will be made free of charge
for parts and labor, except for the battery, which will be adjusted on a pro-rata basis ...
Any repaired or replaced parts are covered only for the remainder of this warranty. All
parts replaced under this warranty become the property of Honda.
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provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided
in [article 2]. " 17 Under section 2-719, however, the buyer would be enti-
tled to reject under section 2-601, to revoke under section 2-608, or to sue
for breach of warranty under section 2-714 if the court finds the "exclu-
sive or limited remedy [to repair or replace the defective parts] to fail of
its essential purpose.""8
Power train parts covered-
Engine: Cylinder block, head, and Engine seals
all internal parts. Flywheel
Valve train Oil pump
Manifolds Water
pump
Transaxle: Manual transmission/differential, and all internal parts
Automatic transmission/differential, and all internal parts.
Driveshafts and CV (constant velocity) joints.
This Warranty Does Not Cover.
Emission control systems (refer to the Emission Control Warranties...
Tires (refer to the tire manufacturer's warranty that came with the car). If you have any
problems with tires, ask your Honda dealer for assistance.
Parts that fail due to lack of required maintenance, use of nonequivalent parts, or racing.
Normal wear or deterioration of any part.
Any car registered or normally driven outside of the United States, Puerto Rico, and the
U.S. Virgin Islands.
The replacement of expendable maintenance items when the replacement is not due to a
defect in material or factory workmanship.
Any car on which the odometer has been altered, or on which the actual mileage cannot
be determined.
Adjustments, unless made as part of a warranty repair.
Accessories ....
Disclaimer of Consequential Damages and Limitations of Implied Warranties
Honda disclaims any responsibility for loss of time or use of the parts or vehicle in which
the parts are installed, transportation or any other incidental or consequential damage; any
implied warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantability, are limited to the
duration of this written warranty.
Some states do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty lasts, or the exclu-
sion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the above limitations or exclu-
sions may not apply to you.
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also have other rights which
vary from state to state.
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-719(1)(a) (1981).
18. Id. § 2-719(2) (1981).
The following cases illustrate how § 2-719 is used to circumvent the standard repair or replace
warranty: Conte v. Dwan Lincoln Mercury, 172 Conn. 112,.., 374 A.2d 144, 149 (1976) Cimited
remedy... had failed of its essential purpose when after numerous attempts to repair, the automo-
bile still did not operate as a new automobile should, free from defects"); Durfee v. Rod Baxter
Imports, 262 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. 1977) (footnote omitted) ("So long as the seller repairs the
goods each time a defect arises, a repair-and-replace clause does not fail of its essential purpose. But
if repairs are not successfully undertaken within a reasonable time, the buyer may be deprived of the
benefits of the exclusive remedy."); McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, 5 Ohio St. 3d 181,
., 449 N.E.2d 1289, 1294-95 (1983) (buyer allowed to revoke acceptance where seller failed to cure
under warranty); Osbura v. Bendix Home Systems, 613 P.2d 445, 449-50 (Okla. 1980) (buyer of
leaking mobile home allowed damages under U.C.C. § 2-714(2) where manufacturer failed within
reasonable time to repair or replace defective parts under warranty); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp.,
4




U.C.C. section 2-601 permits a buyer to reject an automobile before
acceptance if the automobile or the tender of delivery "fail[s] in any re-
spect to conform to the contract." 19 The "perfect tender rule" of classi-
cal contract law, continued in section 2-601,2o bases the buyer's right to
reject on any nonconformity.21
Sellers are protected from the broad right to reject. Under section 2-
602(l), rejection must occur within a reasonable time after delivery or
tender of the automobile,' and the buyer must seasonably notify the
seller of rejection in order for it to be effective.23
88 S.D. 612,_..., 226 N.W.2d 157, 161 (1975) (unreasonable delay in repairing vehicle was a breach
of the limited warranty causing the warranty to fail of its essential purpose).
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-601 (1981) provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts (Section 2-
612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy
(Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to
conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
Subsection (b) of § 2-601 permits the buyer to accept an automobile with knowledge of its non-
conformity; this provision leaves open the buyer's option to revoke under § 2-608 after acceptance.
See infra notes 45-125 and accompanying text.
20. Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 N.L 277, _ 440 A.2d 1345, 1349 (1982).
21. Relatively few reported automobile cases are actually decided on the rejection theory.
"Revocation of acceptance is the main battleground for buyers wishing to get rid of what they be-
lieve to be a 'lemon' . ... [Let it be remembered that rejection is a fleeting remedy, seldom handled
well by either dealer or buyer." R. BIuLINGS, supra note 4, § 5.7. For this reason, most cases
defining the requirements of a § 2-601 rejection rarely result in a finding of rejection, but rather
discuss rejection before deciding the buyer's remedy based on revocation of acceptance or on breach
of warranty. The following cases suggest various applications of the element of nonconformity:
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[B]reach of warranty and
nonconformity are not entirely congruent, concepts; the former being a subset of the latter."); Atlan
Indus. v. O.E.M., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 184, 188 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (plastic whose melting temperature
failed to meet industry standards was nonconforming); Ramirez, 88 N.L at -, 440 A.2d at 1350
(even "curable" or "insubstantial" defects, if not cured within a reasonable time, constitute noncon-
formity justifying rejection); Jakowski v. Carole Chevrolet, 180 N.L Super. 122, _, 433 A.2d 841,
843 (1981) ("no particular quantum of nonconformity is required where a single delivery is contem-
plated"). U.C.C. § 2-106(2) states that "[g]oods... are 'conforming'.. . when they are in accord-
ance with the obligations under the contract." OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-106(2) (1981).
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-602(1) (1981) provides that "[r]ejection of goods must be within
a reasonable time after their delivery or tender. It is ineffective unless the buyer seasonably notifies
the seller."
23. Id "Seasonably" is defined in § 1-204 as "at or within the time agreed or if no time is
agreed at or within a reasonable time." O=rA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 1-204(3) (1981). "Reasonable
time" after delivery or tender under § 2-513(1)(1981) has been variously defined as "usually coinci-
dental with the period of time during which the buyer may exercise his right to inspect the goods for
conformity to the contract". Rutland Music Serv. v. Ford Motor Co., 138 Vt. 562, -, 422 A.2d
248, 249 (1980). Reasonable time is dependent on the buyer's action following delivery. CMI Corp.
v. Leemar Steel Co., 733 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1984) (fact that buyer and seller tried for four
[Vol. 21:318
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Furthermore, under section 2-605(1)(a),24 if the buyer fails to spec-
ify the defect justifying rejection, then the seller cannot exercise the right
to cure granted under section 2-508.25 If the buyer rejects a nonconform-
ing automobile, the seller may supply a conforming automobile while any
obligation remains to be performed under the contract, provided the
seller first seasonably notified the buyer of this intention.26 The repair or
replace warranty27 gives an express right to cure to the seller of a defec-
tive automobile, and makes it likely, moreover, that the buyer will re-
quest cure.
The seller's right to correct or replace the defective part is another
protection against the buyer's right to reject arbitrarily for any noncon-
formity. The right to cure, however, does not last indefinitely.28 Should
the seller elect to cure but later fail to deliver a conforming automobile,
the buyer would be entitled to damages under section 2-711.29
The buyer who attempts to reject must not do anything inconsistent
with rejection. Because the U.C.C. prohibits but does not specifically
define "any exercise of ownership,"30 the buyer should return the auto-
mobile to the seller if at all possible. If the buyer does not return the
automobile to the seller, the buyer must hold the automobile with reason-
able care until the seller removes it. 1 While the buyer may have to exer-
cise this degree of reasonable control, the buyer must refrain from using
months after delivery and discovery of defect to find someone to cure defective goods defeated
buyer's claim of rejection within reasonable time).
24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-605(I)(a) (1981).
25. Id § 2-508 (1981).
26. Id. § 2-508(l) (1981).
27. See supra note 16.
28. Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, 172 Conn. 112, -, 374 A.2d 144, 149 (1976); see also
Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 NJ. 277, _ 440 A.2d 1345, 1349 (1982) ("further reasonable time [under
§ 2-508(2)] depends on the surrounding circumstances, which include the change of position by and
the amount of inconvenience to the buyer[ and] the length of time needed by the seller to correct the
nonconformity and his ability to salvage the goods by resale....").
29. OK"A. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-711 (1981); see Jakowski, 180 N.J. Super. at_ 433 A.2d at 843-
44 (buyer awarded damages for breach of contract where seller's failure to undercoat and add poly-
mer coating was found to be failure to deliver conforming goods).
30. OKLA. STAT. tit 12A, § 2-602(2) (1981) provides that "[s]ubject to the provisions of the
two following sections on rejected goods (Sections 2-603 and 2-604), (a) after rejection any exercise
of ownership by the buyer with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller."
31. Id § 2-602(2)(b) (1981) provides:
[I]f the buyer has before rejection taken physical possession of goods in which he does
not have a security interest under the provisions of this Article (subsection (3) of Section 2-
711), he is under a duty after rejection to hold them with reasonable care at the seller's
disposition for a time sufficient to permit the seller to remove them ....
Id § 2-711(3) (1981) provides that the buyer "has a security interest in goods in his possession
or control for any payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their
inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like
manner as an aggrieved seller.. . ." Id. § 2-706 (1981) specifies the requirements for valid resale.
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the automobile so as not to be held to have accepted it.32
Damages awarded to the successful buyer who sues under a rejec-
tion theory may be inadequate to compensate for the defect in the auto-
mobile, the inconvenience, and the cost of the lawsuit. After rightful
rejection, section 2-711(1) provides for cancellation of the contract and
allows the buyer to recover "so much of the price as has been paid."33
Section 2-711(3) uses the language of section 2-715(1) 31 which permits
recovery of incidental damages,35 but under section 2-711(3) a buyer who
has possession of an automobile which has been rejected may not be able
to realize any such incidental damages without reselling the car him-
self.36 Ultimately, the buyer who is financing the purchase may have
discovered the defect early enough to be able to reject, but too early in
terms of the portion of the purchase price already paid. Even combined
with incidental damages, the award may fall short of court costs and
attorney fees.
The buyer who rejects in Oklahoma may be compensated for attor-
ney fees under section 936 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes which
permits the court at its discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing
party in an action involving a contract for the sale of goods.37 Section
936 has been successfully invoked in an action to recover the purchase
price on a sale of goods and does not appear to exclude other contract
actions such as rejection or revocation of acceptance. 38  A claim for at-
torney fees must be carefully documented.39
Probably the most difficult element to prove in rejection of an auto-
mobile is that the buyer rejected before acceptance.4 The lay buyer may
32. See infra text accompanying notes 40-44.
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-711(1) (1981).
34. Id. § 2-715(1) (1981) provides:
Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably in-
curred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully re-
jected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.
35. The standard warranty excludes consequential and incidental damages. R. BImLmNos, supra
note 4, § 6.8.
36. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-706 (1981) prescribes the guidelines for resale.
37. OxLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1981).
38. Arine v. McAmis, 603 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Okla. 1979) (buyer who rescinded contract to buy
a horse was awarded attorney fees; legislature did not intend to limit coverage of § 936 to ordinary
damage awards alone and § 936 is applicable to any action to "recover" under contract).
39. See eg., Darrow v. Spencer, 581 P.2d 1309, 1313-14 (Okla. 1978) (attorney fees refused in
sale of goods action for failure to prove reasonableness and value of fees and failure to document
attorney services).
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-606 (1981) provides:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the
[Vol. 21:318
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perceive that acceptance occurs when the buyer picks up the automo-
bile.41 The U.C.C. protects the buyer from this perception with a re-
quirement that acceptance cannot occur before a reasonable opportunity
to inspect the goods.42 However, the fact that most reported litigation
involving defective automobiles rests on either revocation of acceptance
or breach of warranty and not on rejection43 indicates, however, that the
reasonable opportunity to inspect is not long enough to permit the dis-
covery of latent defects which might support an attempt to reject before
acceptance.44
B. Revocation of Acceptance
Once the buyer has accepted and passed the opportunity to reject for
any defect,4" revocation of acceptance is possible, but is limited by more
stringent requirements than rejection.46 These requirements concern:
(1) whether the buyer knew of the nonconformity at the time of accept-
goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their non-con-
formity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602), but such
acceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is wrongful
as against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit.
See, eg., CMI Corp. v. Leemar Steel Co., 733 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1984); Atlan Indus. v.
O.E.M., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 184, 187-88 (W.D. Okla. 1983). Under § 2-607(2) (1981) acceptance
precludes rejection.
41. It is also a commonplace that automobiles depreciate suddenly upon delivery to the buyer.
R. BILLINGS, supra note 4, § 1.28, acknowledges this depreciation. 'The last thing a dealer wants to
do is to take back a car. This would cause the dealer, rather than the buyer to absorb the initial, and
substantial, drop in value most new cars experience after retail delivery." Id.
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-513 (1981) (buyer's right to inspect before payment or accept-
ance); id. § 2-606(1)(a), (b) (1981) (reasonable opportunity to inspect must precede acceptance).
43. See supra note 21.
44. This is explained in part by the difficulty involved in inspecting an automobile for defects
which may not manifest themselves until later. Section 2-608(1)(b) (1981) acknowledges this as
"difficulty of discovery [of the non-conformity]" and would seem to have been written specifically for
intricate and mass-produced machines such as the automobile.
45. See supra notes 19-44 and accompanying text.
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608 (1981) provides:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-
conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it
has not been seasonably cured,
or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the
seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in
8
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ance; (2) the nature of the nonconformity; and (3) actions taken by the
buyer and seller after the discovery of the defect.
1. Buyer's Knowledge of the Nonconformity
Under section 2-607(1), acceptance triggers the buyer's duty to
pay.4 7 The buyer is assumed to have inspected the automobile and ac-
cepted it whether conforming or nonconforming.48 If the automobile
was accepted as nonconforming, the buyer may later revoke if the accept-
ance was based "on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity
would be seasonably cured."'49 The buyer will have to prove that, from
the seller's assurance at the time of delivery or from the express limited
warranty, the buyer reasonably assumed the defect would be cured." If,
however, the automobile was accepted as conforming, then under section
2-608(1)(b) the buyer may revoke acceptance. Section 2-608(1)(b) is par-
ticularly applicable to the case of a defective automobile because it ac-
knowledges the potential for latent defects ("without discovery of such
non-conformity"), the difficulty of adequate inspection before acceptance
("difficulty of discovery"), and the reliance of the buyer on the "seller's
assurances" including the standard repair or replace warranty.51 Thus
the automobile buyer's right to revoke will usually derive from section 2-
608(1)(b).
Subsections (a) and (b) of section 2-608(1) are the threshold provi-
sions for revocation of acceptance. If at acceptance the buyer's assump-
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the
buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
As the Kansas Supreme Court held in Johnson v. GMC, Chevrolet Motors Div., 233 Kan.
1044, -, 668 P.2d 139, 142 (1983):
One who has held goods for a period of time or has by some action accepted, should have a
greater burden to require a seller to accept return of the goods previously delivered to the
buyer. The longer the buyer holds the goods, the greater the depreciation and if the buyer
uses the goods after revocation of acceptance he will derive some benefit while using the
goods.
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-607(1) (1981) states that "[t]he buyer must pay at the contract
rate for any goods accepted."
48. Id. § 2-606(1) (1981) states that acceptance by notification to the seller requires prior op-
portunity to inspect Section 2-606(1)(b) states that acceptance by failure to reject cannot occur
before a reasonable opportunity to inspect. Buyers are not expected, however, to have submitted the
automobile to an inspection by a mechanic. Cf Atlan Indus. v. O.E.M., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 184, 188
(W.D. Okla. 1983) ("the law does not require the buyer to perform any more tests than are common
in the industry"). Moreover, even a detailed inspection might not reveal latent defects.
49. OKrA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-607(2) (1981).
50. OxrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-608 official U.C.C. comment 3 (West 1981).
51. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(1)(b) (1981).
[Vol. 21:318
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tions about the nonconformity of the automobile fit either 2-608(l)(a) or
(b), then the buyer may attempt to revoke. The requirements for rightful
revocation will be examined as interpreted in Oberg v. Phillips,12 the only
reported Oklahoma case to date involving revocation of acceptance of an
automobile under section 2-608,"a in Oklahoma cases involving revoca-
tion of other types of goods, and in section 2-608 automobile cases from
other states.
Beginning on the first day after acceptance of a new automobile, the
buyer in Oberg began to discover numerous trivial defects 4 which the
buyer reported to the seller over the next two months. After the automo-
bile was left for repairs twelve to fifteen times, the buyer's attorney ap-
parently gave the seller a specified time "to put the car in proper running
order."55 Approximately one month later, after the seller had failed to
comply, the buyer returned the automobile and gave written notice of
revocation of acceptance.56 Three weeks later the seller informed the
buyer that the automobile had been repaired, but the buyer refused to
take it back 7 and filed suit to recover the purchase price under section 2-
608.58 The automobile had been out of service for repairs "no less than
thirty days and parts of twelve to fifteen more."5 9
52. 615 P.2d 1022 (Okla. CL App. 1980).
53. There are other Oklahoma cases where the buyer of a defective vehicle attempted to recover
the purchase price paid. See, eg., Z.D. Howard Co. v. Cartwright, 537 P.2d 345, 348 (Okla. 1975)
(buyer allowed to sue for rescission and refund and for punitive damages under § 2-721 where seller
fraudulently misrepresented damaged automobile as new); L.R. Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935,
942 (Okla. 1967) (automobile with defective crank shaft returned to seller, court awarded refund of
price making no reference to § 2-608); Kirk v. Leeman, 163 Okla. 236, 239, 22 P.2d 382, 386 (1933)
(refund of purchase price awarded to buyer unable to return defective automobile because seller
repossessed the car by stealth); Spaulding Mfg. Co. v. Holiday, 32 Okla. 823, 826, 124 P. 35, 36
(1912) (unsuccessful attempt to rescind contract for purchase of buggy of inferior quality).
54. The buyer reported the following defects: driver's seat was stuck, hood was loose and mis-
aligned, trunk leaked and was misaligned, trim on door was missing, chrome on doors was chipped,
cruise control functioned improperly, there were paint runs on the body, trim was loose on rear
window, glove box would not close firmly, radio picked up interference from other electrical compo-
nents, dimmer switch cover was loose, motor would not run smoothly between 35 and 45 m.p.h.,
automobile lost or gained speed while constant pressure was applied to accelerator, automobile got
only 10 m.p.g. although advertised at 15 m.p.g., automobile was hard to start and stalled once, right
front fender was dented and had chipped paint, heater fan was noisy, steering wheel was improperly
set, gear shift indicator did not show gear in which automobile was engaged, front windows were
improperly sealed, chrome on left rear sidelight was loose. Oberg, 615 P.2d at 1024-25.
55. Id. at 1025.
56. IA
57. Id.
58. Id at 1024.
59. Id. at 1025.
19851
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 21 [1985], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol21/iss2/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:318
2. The Nature of the Nonconformity: Substantial Impairment
The nonconformity giving the buyer a right to revoke acceptance
under section 2-608 is not simply any nonconformity as in rejection
under section 2-601.6 Section 2-608 permits revocation of acceptance
only where the nonconformity of a lot or a commercial unit "substan-
tially impairs its value to [the buyer]., 61 The requirement of substantial
impairment "protects the seller from revocation for trivial defects ' 62 and
"prevents the buyer from taking undue advantage of the seller by al-
lowing goods to depreciate and then returning them because of asserted
minor defects.",63
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals is in accord with other courts
which have held substantial impairment to be a question of fact.64 The
test for substantial impairment under section 2-608(1) is subjective; the
value to the buyer must be substantially impaired from the buyer's point
of view.65 In Oberg the Oklahoma Court of Appeals adopted this subjec-
tive test66 which may be described as an objective determination of sub-
jective factors. 67 The "needs and circumstances of the particular buyer
must be examined" and not those of the "reasonable" person.68
Although section 2-608(1) requires that substantial impairment be
60. See supra note 21.
61. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(1) (1981).
62. Ramirez v. Autosport, 88 NJ. 277, _, 440 A.2d 1345, 1350 (1982) (dictum).
63. Id
64. Oberg, 615 P.2d at 1024; see also Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, 172 Conn. 112,.., 374
A-2d 144, 148 (1976) (question of fact subject to the jury's determination); Pavesi v. Ford Motor
Co., 155 NJ. Super. 373, _, 382 A.2d 954, 956 (1978) (court found substantial impairment as a
fact); McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler Plymouth, 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, _, 449 N.E.2d 1289, 1294
(1983) (substantial impairment "is a determination exclusively within the purview of the fact-
finder"). But see Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, 262 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 1977) (on appeal
court may determine substantial impairment as legal question on facts found by trial court).
65. Official U.C.C. comment 2 to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-608 (West 1981) states:
Revocation of acceptance is possible only where the non-conformity substantially im-
pairs the value of the goods to the buyer. For this purpose the test is not what the seller
had reason to know at the time of contracting; the question is whether the non-conformity
is such as will in fact cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the seller
had no advance knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances.
66. Oberg, 615 P.2d at 1024.
67. Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, 117 N.H. 85, _, 370 A.2d 270, 273 (1977) ("This
determination is not, however, made by reference to the buyer's personal belief as to the reduced
value of the goods in question. The trier of fact must make an objective determination that the value
of the goods to the buyer has in fact been substantially impaired.") (emphasis added); see also Jack-
son v. Rocky Mountain Datsun, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 885, 888 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)
("reference must be made to the effect of the goods' nonconformities upon the particular buyer");
McCullough, 5 Ohio St. 3d at -, 449 N.E.2d at 1294 (determination of substantial impairment
"must be based on objective evidence of the buyer's idiosyncratic tastes and needs").
68. Asciolla, 117 N.H. at _, 370 A.2d at 273 (buyer seeking revocation was a "particularly
prudent and painstaking car buyer" who had previously refused a car with a repaired fender).
11
Rehberg: Buyer's Remedies for a Defective Automobile: The U.C.C. Versus th
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
OKLAHOMA LEMON LAW
determined with respect to the buyer and not to the reasonable buyer,69
the courts arguably have not set a particularly difficult standard of proof.
With obvious sympathy for the buyer, the courts have accepted evidence
of nonconformity annoying to any automobile owner. The buyer's attor-
ney should be aware, however, that the U.C.C. requires specific evidence
of diminished value to that buyer. Evidence which might fit this subjec-
tive test includes "great inconvenience and financial loss"7 and lost
wages.71
Several categories of nonconformity have been held to constitute
substantial impairment. These include simple failure by the seller to re-
pair the defective automobile72 and the buyer's loss of faith in the safety
and integrity of the automobile.73
The third category of substantial impairment, the magnitude of the
nonconformity, has been a primary area of disagreement. It has been
suggested that "[t]he common law concept of 'material breach' is at least
a first cousin to the concept of substantial nonconformity"'74 and in a
similar vein courts have held that minor defects do not constitute sub-
stantial impairment.75 It has been held that trivial defects can contribute
to substantial impairment when a "major" defect is also present.76 Fi-
nally, some courts have interpreted substantial impairment as the cumu-
lative effect of numerous defects.77
The question of the magnitude of the nonconformity has been de-
69. OCLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(1) (1981).
70. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283,., 224 So. 2d 638 646 n.5 (1969) (automobile
was in dealer's shop for repairs on 30 occasions, totaling 40 to 50 days).
71. Jackson, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 887 (buyer's employer became upset when
buyer missed work because of defective automobile).
72. Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 527, 533 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972)
("unsuccessful repair" gives the buyer the right to revoke acceptance).
73. Sea e.g., Ascolla, 117 N.H. at , 370 A.2d at 274 ("It is the integrity of the vehicle as a
whole which is the essence of the consumer's bargain."); Paves!, 155 N.J. Super. at _, 382 A.2d at
955 (recurrent paint defects marred appearance and value of new automobile); Zabriskie Chevrolet
v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, - 240 A.2d 195, 205 (1968) ("For a majority of people the purchase
of a new car is a major investment, rationalized by the peace of mind that flows from its dependabil-
ity and safety.").
74. . WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 8-3, at 305 (2d ed. 1980).
75. See e.g., Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, -, 224 A.2d
782, 784 (1966) (loose engine mounts which were easily corrected were not substantial impairment).
76. See, eg., Durfee, 262 N.W.2d at 354 (minor defects in combination with frequent stalling
constituted substantial impairment); Stofrnan v. Keenan Motors, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 56, 58 (1973)
(annoying vibrations in combination with dangerous stalling constituted substantial impairment).
77. See e.g., Jackson, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 888 (cumulative difficulties and
unsuccessful repairs were evidence of substantial impairment); Zoss, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) at 532 ("[C]umulative effect of all the non-conformities, [sic] so impaired the value of the
commercial unit as to constitute a substantial impairment to the plaintiffs.").
1985]
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cided by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals with a cumulative effect test.
In a case such as Oberg, where the car was plagued with an inordinate
number of trivial defects,7" the Oklahoma court will not "search through
the defects to find one it can classify as substantial to justify revocation of
acceptance. The remedy should be available in a proper case even if each
defect taken individually could be considered trivial."7 9 The buyer in
Oklahoma need only prove, according to Oberg, that "the cumulative
effect of the defects and lack of repair .. constitute[d] a substantial
impairment of the value of the goods to the buyer within the context of
section 2-608. "80
3. Buyer's and Seller's Actions After Discovery of the Defect
In determining whether the buyer's revocation of acceptance was
justifiable, the courts will also look carefully at: (a) whether the buyer
should have and did allow the seller to attempt to cure; (b) whether the
buyer revoked within a reasonable time; and (c) whether the buyer noti-
fied the seller of the revocation. The standard of proof required here is
arguably more demanding than for the determination of substantial im-
pairment, perhaps because the courts want to encourage buyer and seller
to document their activity carefully.
a. Seller's right to cure
The seller's right to cure before the buyer is allowed to revoke under
section 2-608(1)(a) is certain: the buyer accepted with knowledge of a
nonconformity which the buyer assumed would be "seasonably cured."81
The seller's right to cure before a revocation under section 2-608(1)(b)82
is in dispute. Although this section does not refer to "cure," official com-
ment 4 to the U.C.C. states. in part that "this remedy will be generally
resorted to only after attempts at adjustment have failed."83 Further-
more, as a practical matter, if the buyer has a warranty which covers the
defect in question, the buyer will generally give the seller an opportunity
to repair the defect.84
78. Oberg, 615 P.2d at 1024-25; see supra note 54.
79. Oberg, 615 P.2d at 1026.
80. Id
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(1)(a) (1981). The seller's right to cure is found in § 2-508.
See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
82. Most automobile revocations appear to be based on § 2-608(1)(b). See supra text accompa-
nying note 51.
83. OKLA. STAT. ANN. 12A, § 2-608 official U.C.C. comment 4 (West 1981).
84. Most buyers could not afford the economic burden and the inconvenience of doing without
[Vol. 21:318
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Among those courts acknowledging that the buyer should allow the
seller a chance to cure, the right to cure is generally held to be for a
limited time."5 The Oberg decision suggests a practical safeguard: obtain
an agreement in writing with the seller, specifying the time to be allowed
"to put the car in proper running order."
86
b. Revocation within reasonable time
Section 2-608(2) protects the seller from revocation for defects
which the buyer caused or for which the seller should bear no responsi-
bility.17 With timely notice, the seller can attempt to negotiate an accept-
able cure or monetary settlement. 8 Both buyer and seller ought to be
held responsible for avoiding the economic waste of worsening defects
and depreciation.89
The issue of reasonable time for revocation is a question of fact de-
pendent on the circumstances. 90 Delay by the buyer in revoking has been
justified by interpreting each request for repairs as a separate attempt at
revocation, 91 by recognition of buyer's prompt initial request for re-
an automobile while the court rules on the claim of revocation. Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 NJ.
Super. 373, _, 382 A.2d 954, 956 (1978). Authorities have also recognized the limited usefulness of
the seller's right to cure which may be implied under § 2-608(1)(b). The right to cure may be limited
to "trivial defects or defects easily curable." Pavesi, 155 N.J. Super. at _, 382 A.2d at 956. Accord-
Lg to this view, curing substantial defects would destroy the revocation remedy, leaving only the
possibility of damages for breach of warranty. R. BILLINGS, supra note 4, § 5.43. It is arguable that
in the case of a grossly defective automobile any cure short of replacement would be insufficient.
Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, 117 N.H. 85, _, 370 A.2d 270, 274 (1977).
85. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, _ 224 So. 2d 638, 644 (1969) ("[A]t some
point in time, it must become obvious to all people that a particular vehicle simply cannot be re-
paired or parts replaced so that the same is made free from defect."); Jackson v. Rocky Mountain
Datsun, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 885, 889 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (dealer not allowed to
introduce testimony that automobile was repaired after plaintiff buyer's revocation of acceptance).
86. Oberg, 615 P.2d at 1025; accord Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
527, 531 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972) (buyer and seller set "seasonable" deadline for repairs).
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(2) states in part, "[rI]evocation of acceptance must occur
within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the grounds for it and
before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects."
88. R. BLLINGS, supra note 4, § 5.38. The author suggests a two-part test for unreasonable
delay in notification: (1) Did the delay cause unreasonable consequential damages to accrue to the
buyer? (2) Could the defect have been repaired had it not been allowed to worsen? Id
89. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, 262 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. 1977) (court excused 6,300
miles logged "in a conservative manner" and radio aerial broken by vandals). Official U.C.C. com-
ment 6 to Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 2-608 (1981) states that "worthless goods, however, need not
be offered back [to the seller after revocation] and minor defects in the articles reoffered are to be
disregarded."
90. CMI Corp. v. Leemar Steel Co., 733 F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir. 1984); Four Sons Bakery v.
Dulman, 542 F.2d 829, 832 (10th Cir. 1976).
91. Pavesi, 155 NJ. Super. at _, 382 A.2d at 956.
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pairs, 92 and by holding that the reasonable timeframe for notice of revo-
cation does not have to include time during which the seller attempts to
cure.93 The buyer would be well advised, therefore, to keep a written
record of requests for repairs to prove the buyer did not delay in report-
ing the defect and was willing to negotiate.
c Notification of revocation
Revocation of acceptance is ineffective unless the buyer notifies the
seller.94 The U.C.C. does not specify the requirements of notification,
although official comment 5 specifies the policy aims to be served by noti-
fication.95 An attempt to negotiate a settlement has been construed as
notice.96 Although a letter need not detail the nonconformity,97 an
Oklahoma court may require written notice.98
One commentator has suggested the following elements for an ac-
ceptable notification:
1. Notice in writing sent by registered mail;
2. List of those nonconformities constituting substantial
impairment;
3. Affirmative statement of revocation;99
4. Dispatch after buyer discovers or should have discovered
the defect; oo
5. Copies sent to the manufacturer (and financier, if
applicable).101
92. Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (renn. Ct. App. 1972)
(notice of revocation eight months after discovery of defect not unreasonably late).
93. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1124 (8th Cir. 1982) ("consumer should
not be penalized for continued patience with a seller who promises or repeatedly attempts to make
good a nonconforming delivery"); Durfee, 262 N.W.2d at 353 ("period in which seller attempts to
cure the nonconformity is not part of the time in which the buyer must act [to revoke]"); Moore, 492
S.W.2d at 230 (delay in revocation should be balanced against time allowed seller to fulfill his obliga-
tion to repair under the contract).
94. OKmA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(2) (1981).
95. Official U.C.C. comment 5 to OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-608 (West 1981) provides in
part that the notice should be given in accordance with good faith, the prevention of surprise, and
reasonable adjustment.
96. See Pavesi, 155 N.J. Super. at _, 382 A.2d at 957.
97. Jackson v. Rocky Mountain Datsun, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 885, 890 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984)(notice need not specify nonconformities where buyer had repeatedly described them to the seller
when asking for repairs).
98. Oberg, 615 P.2d at 1025 (buyer returned car to dealer and gave written notice of
revocation).
99. R. Bnj.uGs, supra note 4, §§ 5.31, 5.11.
100. Id § 5.31.
101. Id §§ 5.31, 5.12.
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4. Buyer's Rights and Duties After Revocation
A buyer who justifiably revokes acceptance of an automobile "has
the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had
rejected them.""1 2 An examination of these rights and duties reveals two
issues: (a) return of the automobile; and (b) damages after revocation of
acceptance.
a. Return of the automobile
Following a justifiable rejection or revocation of acceptance, "any
exercise of ownership by the buyer . . . is wrongful as against the
seller." 103 This provision and the practical reality that the buyer wants
to be rid of the lemon"° argue that the buyer should return the car to the
seller. 105
The express prohibition of wrongful exercise of ownership has given
rise to the often disputed issue of "continued use" in automobile revoca-
tion cases." °6 Use of an automobile in which a defect has been discovered
may continue after discovery of the defect and while the seller is attempt-
ing cure, 10 7 or after the buyer gives the seller notice of revocation of ac-
ceptance (which under section 2-608(2) must be within a reasonable time
after the discovery of the defect).108 The buyer's continued use may be
reasonable in the circumstances"0 9 or may be a further opportunity for
the seller to cure and convince the buyer not to revoke.' 10
102. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(3) (1981).
103. Ia § 2-602(2)(a) (1981).
104. J. WHrlE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 74, § 8-1 define "revocation" as a "refusal on the
buyer's part to keep the goods."
105. Rights and duties of a buyer who does not return the automobile are discussed in the con-
text of rejection. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
106. Compare Case Note, Ozark v. Neidecker: A Buyer's Continued Use of Goods After Revoca-
tion ofAcceptance, 38 ARK. L. REv. 857, 867 (1985) (continued use may be reasonable depending on
seller's conduct and hardship to buyer) with Note, Postrevocation Use: An Impermissible Interpreta-
tion of the U.CC, 35 CASE W. RESERVE 282, 293-97 (1984) (postrevocation use inconsistent with
strict requirements and restricted remedies for revoking buyer).
107. In this sense, continued use is related to the requirement that revocation occur within a
reasonable time after discovery of the defect. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
108. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-608(2) (1981).
109. The seller may have refused the buyer's offer to return the vehicle. See, e.g., Johnson v.
General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Motor Div., 233 Kan. 1044, _, 688 P.2d 139, 143 (1983) (buyer
who drove an additional 14,619 miles after revoking acceptance of truck was justified by seller's
refusal to accept and lack of public transportation); McCullough v. Bill Swad Chrysler Plymouth, 5
Ohio St. 3d 181, _, 449 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (1983) (buyer who drove automobile an additional
23,000 miles after seller gave no instructions for return was justified under the court's five-part test
for reasonable continued use).
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Ideally, the buyer should request instructions for return of the auto-
mobile. 11  The following suggestions have been offered:
1. Remove all personal belongings;
2. Offer the certificate of title and keys to the dealer in the
presence of a witness;
3. Return license plates and registration to the state if re-
quired by law;
4. Record the odometer reading and take photos to document
the condition in which the car was left.112
In the alternative, the buyer should either store the automobile and cease
to use it" 3 or resell or trade it. Regardless of the alternative selected, the
buyer must keep careful documentation. 1 4
b. Damages after revocation of acceptance
According to the U.C.C., the buyer who justifiably revokes accept-
ance is entitled to the same recovery as the buyer who rejects before ac-
ceptance.' 1 5 The buyer does not gain monetarily by revoking acceptance
instead of rejecting. The buyer has gained time since revocation is gener-
ally allowed later than rejection. In addition, the buyer may gain some
satisfaction from the fact that the seller has to absorb the depreciation of
the automobile, which will be greater after revocation than after
rejection.
The court may mitigate the amount of depreciation the seller has to
absorb by subtracting from the buyer's damages an "offset" for the value
of the buyer's use of the automobile.",6 The award of an offset to the
seller is based on judicial application of equitable principles and not on
any U.C.C. provisions." 7
111. See, ag., OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-603 (1981) (requiring that a merchant buyer under
certain circumstances request instructions for disposal of the goods). Practically speaking, the pru-
dent buyer will discuss return of the vehicle with the seller.
112. R. BULINGS, supra note 4, § 5.32.
113. I
114. Id § 5.33.
115. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. Where the full price has not yet been paid,
the buyer may recover only the down payment and any installments made on the full price. Evans v.
Graham Ford, 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, -, 442 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1981). The buyer's damages are
measured as his restitution interest, restoring him to pre-contract status. Ramirez v. Autosport, 88
NJ. 277, -, 440 A.2d 1345, 1351 (1982) (describing damages for rejection). The Oberg court was
silent on the issue of damages.
116. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
117. Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 NJ. Super. 373, _ 382 A.2d 954, 957 (1978) (offset based
on theories of return of consideration after part performance and buyer as bailee for seller); see also
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It has been held that the seller must ask for an offset.1 1 8 The mea-
sure of the offset has varied; it has been awarded for the value of a substi-
tute automobile loaned to the buyer' 19 and it has been based on the value
and condition of the particular lemon being revoked 2 ' or on the "estab-
lished rate of lease vehicle depreciation."''
In addition to the purchase price less a possible offset, the buyer who
has revoked, like the buyer who has rejected, may receive damages for
"cover"' 22 and for incidental and consequential expenses123 and attorney
fees. 124 The buyer who revokes acceptance also may sue for breach of
warranty. 12
5
C. Breach of Warranty
Once acceptance has occurred and the opportunity to reject has
passed, the buyer, who must now retain the defective automobile, may
consider suit for breach of warranty. 126 The standard new car express
warranty warrants only certain parts and disclaims implied warran-
ties.127 If the defective part is excluded from the express warranty and if
all implied warranties have been effectively disclaimed,128 the buyer has
no cause of action for breach of warranty.
If the defective part is warranted, however, the buyer still must
circumvent the exclusive and limited remedy to repair or replace the de-
fective part. Section 2-719(2) would allow the buyer to sue for breach
118. See, eg., Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, 262 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1977). But see Mc-
Cullough, 5 Ohio St. 3d at -, 449 N.E.2d at 1295 (Holmes, J., dissenting in part) ("trial court
should take judicial notice of the fair market value of the use of such an automobile").
119. See Jackson, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 887.
120. See Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc. 492 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
121. See Johnson v. GMC, Chevrolet Motors Div., 233 Kan. 1044, _, 668 P.2d 139, 145 (1983).
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-711(l)(a) (1981). R. BILLINGS, supra note 4, § 5.5, states that in
the case of a buyer revoking acceptance of an automobile, "cover" might include the expense of
securing a rental or a replacement
123. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-715 (1981). R. BELLINGs, supra note 4, § 5.49, suggests that
incidentals may include towing, repairs done outside of the warranty, storage if the dealer refused
the return of the car, rental car, insurance, and interest on the loan. The author includes as conse-
quential damages loss of use and lost wages. Id
124. It should be remembered that under Oklahoma law the court may award attorney fees in
actions involving contracts for the sale of goods. OKRA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1981); see supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
125. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-608 official U.C.C. comment 1 (West 1981) provides, "the
buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance and recovery of damages for
breach." In fact, however, the buyer who has revoked no longer has a warranty on which to sue
because the buyer no longer has the automobile.
126. Strict liability in tort and negligence as the basis for a products liability suit are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
127. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-316(2), (3) (1981).
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where the exclusive and limited remedy has failed of its essential pur-
pose.129 The number of repair attempts may be the determining
factor.13
0
Since the remedy under the standard warranty is for repair or re-
placement of defective parts, the mere existence of a defect is not a
breach of the warranty. Breach of this warranty occurs only when the
seller has refused, has unsuccessfully attempted, or has taken an unrea-
sonable time to repair or replace the defective part.131 If the seller has
not had a reasonable opportunity to repair or replace, the warranty has
not been breached. 132 Furthermore, the warranty does not specify how
many times the seller may attempt to correct the defect before a reason-
able opportunity to repair or replace has passed. Even having established
a cause of action for breach of warranty, however, the buyer still faces
the obstacles of a difficult lawsuit. 133
The successful party in a breach of warranty suit is entitled to "the
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as
warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a
different amount."1 34 Incidental and consequential damages are also al-
lowed.135 In a successful suit for breach of express or implied warranty,
attorney fees are available under section 939 of title 12 of the Oklahoma
Statutes.136 Circumstances will determine whether keeping the car and
receiving damages for breach of warranty will more adequately compen-
sate the buyer than receiving a refund of the purchase price after rejec-
tion. However, if the automobile is beyond repair, the portion of the
129. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 18.
131. P_ BILLINGS, supra note 4, § 7.35.
132. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
133. R. BILNGs, supra note 4, §§ 7.47, 7.50, lists the following elements to be proved in a
breach of warranty action:
(1) the existence of a defect in the operation of a vehicle,
(2) that the defect resulted from factory material or workmanship (present at the time of
sale),
(3) that the plaintiff presented the vehicle to the dealer with a request that the defect be
repaired (satisfying the notice requirement), and
(4) the dealer failed or refused to repair or replace the defective parts, and
(5) proximate cause.
134. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2-714(2) (1981).
135. IM § 2-714(3) (1981).
136. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 939 (1981); see eg., Osburn v. Bendix Home Sys., 613 P.2d 445,
452 (Okla. 1980) (buyer of mobile home allowed additional costs under § 939 upon successful appeal
for breach of warranty); Hardesty v. Andro Corp.-Webster Div., 555 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Okla. 1976)
(specific mention of breach of express warranty in § 939 does not indicate that § 939 prohibits attor-
ney fees for breach of implied warranty).
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award covering the actual breach will not be sufficient to compensate the
buyer, who will probably have to purchase another car but may not real-
ize much on the trade-in of the lemon.
D. Magnuson-Moss Act
1. Refund or Replacement
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act 137 sets federal minimum standards for "full" consumer
product warranties. 138 Under a full warranty the consumer must be per-
mitted to elect either a refund or a replacement without charge if, after a
reasonable number of attempts, the warrantor is unable to repair the
nonconforming product.'39 The Act is thus a federal lemon law for buy-
ers with a full warranty. Most automobiles, however, are purchased
under limited warranty."4 Therefore, a buyer with a limited warranty
seeking a refund must successfully reject' 4 ' or revoke acceptance' 42
under applicable state law, and a buyer with a limited warranty may seek
a replacement only if the state has a lemon law.'43
2. Arbitration, Disclaimer of Implied Warranties, Attorney Fees
The Magnuson-Moss Act does offer potential protection to the
buyer of a lemon with a limited warranty. First, the Act encourages
warrantors to offer fair and expeditious informal dispute resolution.'" If
the warrantor's dispute resolution procedure meets Federal Trade Com-
mission standards, then the warrantor may include in the warranty a
requirement that the consumer resort to the dispute resolution procedure
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982). The Magnuson-Moss Act was intended "to provide mini-
mum disclosure standards for written consumer product warranties against defect or malfunction; to
define minimum Federal content standards for such warranties; to amend the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act in order to improve its consumer protection activities; and for other purposes." H.R.
REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7702.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(aX1) (1982) provides that a written warranty meeting the minimum stan-
dards set forth in § 2304 "shall be conspicuously designated a 'full (statement of duration) war-
ranty."' All other written warranties must be designated "limited" under § 2303(a)(2). The Act
does not mandate written warranties for consumer products, nor does it require full warranties. It
merely requires that if a written warranty is offered, it must be designated "full" or "limited."
139. Id § 2304(a)(4).
140. Note, WASH. U.L.Q., supra note 15, at 1143. As of 1977, only American Motors Co. of-
fered a "full" warranty; AMC's market share was somewhat less than 2% at that time. Pertschuk,
Consumer Automobile Problems, 11 U.C.C. LJ. 145, 149 n.1l (1978).
141. See supra notes 19-44 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 45-125 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 150-210 and accompanying text.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(1) (1982).
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before bringing a civil action.14
Second, implied warranties may not be disclaimed or modified if the
warrantor makes a written warranty or enters into a service contract
with the consumer."4 The warrantor may only limit the duration of the
implied warranty to the duration of a limited warranty. 147 These implied
warranty provisions may be useful where recovery is not possible under
the express warranty.
Third, the Act provides that the court at its discretion may award
costs and expenses, including attorney fees, to the consumer who prevails
in an action under the Act or under a warranty governed by the Act.14
A significant benefit to consumers in some states, this provision adds lit-
tle more than the stamp of federal approval to the successful consumer's
request for attorney fees in Oklahoma where statute already supports
such a claim. 14 9
III. THE OKLAHOMA LEMON LAW
A. Descrption of the Law
In July, 1985, the Oklahoma Legislature joined the thirty-five other
states 5 which have passed automobile "lemon laws."'51 The Oklahoma
Lemon Law is drafted more broadly than lemon laws in some states, but
is more restrictive than the U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Act.15
The remedies under the Oklahoma Law are available to any "con-
sumer," defined as a purchaser of a motor vehicle not bought for resale,
any person to whom the vehicle is transferred during the period of the
express warranty, and any other person protected by the warranty.1 53
"Motor vehicles" covered by the law are any motor-driven vehicles re-
145. Id § 2310(2), (3). The F.T.C. rules appear at 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1985).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a).
147. Id § 2308(b). Under a full warranty the duration of implied warranties may not be limited.
Id § 2304(a)(2).
148. Id § 2310(d)(2).
149. OCK.A. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 936, 939 (1981); see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
150. See APPNDix B. For comparison of state lemon law provisions, seeA 71vist of Lemon, 50
CONSuMER REP. 192, 193 (1985); Honigman, The New 'Lemon Laws' Expanding UCC Remedies,
17 U.C.C. LJ. 116, 128 (1984).
151. Act of July 15, 1985, 1985 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1201-02 (West) (to be codified at Okla.
Stat. tit. 12A, § 901) (effective Nov. 1, 1985) (hereinafter cited as Okla. Lemon Law). See APPEN-
DIX A.
152. Rigg, Lemon Laws, 18 CLEARiNoHOUSE REv. 1147 (1985), catalogs the variations in com-
mon lemon law provisions from state to state. The Oklahoma Lemon Law is broader than some
laws which, for example, may specifically exclude commercial buyers, Id. at 1149, or may exclude all
but passenger cars, id. at 1148.
153. Okla. Lemon Law § 1(A)(1).
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quired to be registered under the Motor Vehicle License and Registration
Act. 15 4 Motorcycles, motorized bikes, and trucks are covered. 155 "Mo-
tor-driven vehicles" which are not required to be registered in Oklahoma,
such as "self-propelled or motor-driven cycles, known and commonly re-
ferred to as 'minibikes' and other similar trade names,"' 56 including
"'golf carts,' 'go-karts' and other motor vehicles which are manufac-
tured principally for use off the streets and highways,""' are not covered
by the Lemon Law. The Lemon Law expressly excludes "the living facil-
ities of motor homes;"' 58 this exclusion would appear to cover recrea-
tional vehicles and travel trailers.'59 Also expressly excluded is any
vehicle "above ten thousand (10,000) pounds gross vehicle weight. ' ' 1"°
The Lemon Law gives the consumer two distinct rights. The first is
an affirmative right to have the vehicle repaired under any applicable
express warranty. 16 1 The consumer must report the nonconformity di-
rectly to the manufacturer, its agent, or its authorized dealer in writing
within the period of the express warranty or within one year of the origi-
nal delivery of the vehicle to a consumer, whichever is earlier.'62 The
repairs may be made after the notification period has expired.' 63
The second right granted consumers is the "replace or refund" rem-
edy typically identified with lemon laws.'" Under this provision, the
consumer is entitled to a replacement vehicle or a refund after a failure to
conform the vehicle to any express warranty "by repairing or correcting
any defect or condition which substantially impairs the use and value of
the motor vehicle to the consumer after a reasonable number of at-
tempts."'165  A "reasonable number of attempts" shall be presumed if
four or more unsuccessful attempts have been made to repair the same
nonconformity within the warranty term or within one year after original
154. IdL § 1(A)(2). The Motor Vehicle License and Registration Act appears at OKLA. STAT. tit.
47, § 22 (1981).
155. Id §§ 22.1(2), 22.1(16), 22.1(17), 22.5-2, 22.1(32) (1981).
156. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 22.5-1(A) (1981).
157. Id § 22.5-1(C) (1981).
158. Okla. Lemon Law § l(A)(2).
159. OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 22.1(25), (31) (1981). The drafting of the Lemon Law is ambiguous
on this point. The "living facilities of motor homes" may be construed to define motor homes as
living facilities or to mean only the portion of the vehicle which serves as "housing," in which case
the vehicular portion (engine, drive train, driver's cab, etc.) would be covered by the Lemon Law.
160. Okla. Lemon Law § I(AX2).
161. Id. § I(B).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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delivery date, whichever is earlier, or if the vehicle has been out of service
during this same limited period for a cumulative forty-five or more calen-
dar days. 16
6
Affirmative defenses against the replace or refund remedy include:
(1) the nonconformity was not a substantial impairment of use and value
of the vehicle; and (2) the consumer's own abuse, neglect, or unauthor-
ized modifications or alterations caused the nonconformity. 6 7 The con-
sumer must also send prior direct written notification to the
manufacturer and allow the manufacturer an opportunity to cure the
nonconformity. 6 In addition, the consumer must first submit to the
manufacturer's informal dispute settlement procedure if it complies with
the federal standards for such procedures.1 69 Should the consumer lose
under the Lemon Law, remedy is still available for breach of warranty or
after revocation of acceptance since the Lemon Law does not limit rights
under any other law.' 70
B. The Lemon Law and Traditional Remedies Compared
Although there are indications that consumers are invoking lemon
law remedies,17 1 there is not yet a significant body of reported cases to be
studied. 72 It is possible, however, to predict certain difficult issues in a
166. Id § 1(D).
167. Id § I(cQ.
168. Id.
169. Id § 1(19. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1985) specifies the federal standards for informal dispute reso-
lution procedures as authorized at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(2) (Magnuson-Moss Act). See supra notes 144-
45 and accompanying text. According to CONSUMER REP., no arbitration program has been certi-
fied by the F.T.C. under 16 C.F.R. § 703. A Twist of Lemon, supra note 150, at 192. The Connecti-
cut Lemon Law requires the state Department of Consumer Protection to establish an arbitration
panel to which consumers may resort if the manufacturer does not have a dispute settlement proce-
dure in compliance with the F.T.C. rules. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-181(a), (b) (West Supp.
1985). Section 42-182 provides for state certification of a manufacturer's dispute settlement proce-
dures. The Connecticut Lemon Law as amended in 1984 is worthy of consideration in that it now
attempts to answer questions arising under less detailed lemon laws.
170. Okla. Lemon Law, § I(E).
171. See, ag., Spivak, Lemon Laws Trigger More Buybacks, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, July 16, 1984,
at 3, 61. (Rep. John Woodcock, m, Conn., is aware of" 'at least 150' people who have received new
cars or refunds since Oct. 1, 1982" under Connecticut Lemon Law which was the first in the nation
to be passed).
172. The author found three reported decisions and four attorney general opinions-one each
from Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Tennessee. The Connecticut Superior Court in Wilson v.
Cent. Sports, Inc., 40 Conn. Supp. 156, _, 483 A.2d 625, 626 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) held that for
purposes of the Connecticut Lemon Law "motor vehicles" includes motorcycles and that the buyer
could sue under the Lemon Law, since he had to return the motorcycle three times for repairs and
these repairs resulted in the motorcycle being inoperative for more than four months.
Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-32 (Apr. 23, 1985) (available Sept. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, States
library, FLA file) held that the informal dispute resolution panel operating under the Florida Lemon
Law is not limited to determining whether the vehicle conforms to the express warranty but may
23
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lemon law suit. For this purpose, the Oklahoma law will be compared
with the traditional remedies discussed in Part II.
The lemon laws have been passed to address consumer problems
with respect to a particular product, the automobile. The laws are there-
fore written in terms that are at once better defined and more restrictive
than laws applying to sales in general or to consumer problems in
general.
The first notable restriction in the Oklahoma Law is that a merchant
buyer appears to be excluded from the definition of "consumer." This is
in accord with the Magnuson-Moss Act and similar consumer legisla-
tion.173 A merchant buyer may resort to the U.C.C., which defines buyer
as "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods."' 74 Although a
merchant buyer is not covered by the Lemon Law, the definition of con-
sumer does appear broad enough to include commercial buyers not in-
tending to resell, and transferees under the original warranty, which may
include lessees, donees, and other recipients. 175 The type of goods pro-
offer the buyer a remedy. Since the panel's decision binds only the manufacturer and does not
prevent the buyer from filing a formal action, the replacement or repurchase remedy is always poten-
tially available even though the dispute resolution panel may choose not to offer this remedy. Id
The Massachusetts and Nevada opinions interpret the effective date provisions in order to deter-
mine the scope of the lemon laws of those states. Mass Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83/84-6 (Apr. 5, 1984)
(available Sept. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, States library, MASS file) (Massachusetts Lemon law applies to
vehicles delivered after effective date of the law even if ordered prior to effective date); Nev. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 83-7 (July 14, 1983) (available Sept. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, States library, NEV fie)
(Nevada Lemon Law applies only to vehicles sold on or after the effective date of the law).
Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-265 (Sept. 21, 1984) (available Sept. 10, 1985, on LEXIS, States
library, TENN file) held that the election of remedies provision in the Tennessee Lemon Law oper-
ates to bar the buyer from other remedies once the buyer files a formal action seeking replacement or
refund and not when the buyer simply seeks repairs or submits to arbitration under the warranty and
the Lemon Law. The opinion further held that the Tennessee Lemon Law "may apply to 'used' (in
the sense of 'previously owned') motor vehicles in certain circumstances" because "consumer" is
defined as "'any person to whom such motor vehicle is transferred... during the duration of an
express warranty,' and 'any other person entitled by the terms of such warranty' to enforce its obli-
gations." IdL
The New York Lemon Law for new vehicles, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a (McKinney Supp.
1984-85), was discussed in dictum by a New York Civil Court. Barco Auto Leasing v. PSI Cosmet-
ics, 125 Misc. 2d 68, 70, 478 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) (§ 198-a does not apply to
"lemon leases," to automobiles purchased by "corporate entities," or to "transactions affected for
business purposes"). New York also has a Lemon Law for used vehicles. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 198-b (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). A reasonable opportunity to repair is presumed after three
attempts or fifteen days out of service. Id. § 198-b(2). Under this Lemon Law, the condition of the
used vehicle when last returned to the dealer for repairs, and not the condition of the automobile at
the time of the trial, determines whether failure to repair was a substantial impairment of the vehi-
cle's value. Bouchard v. Savoca, - Misc. 2d ., 493 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (Albany Sup. Ct. 1985)
(buyer granted summary judgment for purchase price and attorney fees for used automobile in "su-
perior condition" by the time of the trial).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (1982).
174. OI.LA. STAT. tit 12A, § 2-103(1)(a) (1981).
175. Basanta, The Illinois New Car Buyer Protection Act-An Analysis and Evaluation of the
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tected is limited under the Lemon Law not only to motor vehicles, which
is the intent of the lemon laws, but also to specific classes of vehicles.17 6
No specific vehicles would be excluded under the Magnuson-Moss Act or
under the U.C.C.
The remedies for breach of warranty apply under the Lemon Law
only to consumers holding an express warranty.17 7  Neither the
Magnuson-Moss Act 178 nor the U.C.C.l79 makes such a limitation. It
also is arguable that rejection and revocation of acceptance may be in-
voked by a buyer not holding any warranty at all. 1' °
The time limit for notifying the manufacturer of the nonconformity
is limited under the Lemon Law to one year from the original delivery of
the automobile or to the warranty period if it is shorter.' Thus, a con-
sumer holding a warranty of longer than one year is penalized. A subse-
quent buyer to whom a warranty is transferred has even less than one
year." 2 The U.C.C. requires notification of nonconformity or revocation
of acceptance "within a reasonable time" of discovery of the defect.18
3
The consumer may submit proof under the U.C.C. that delay of more
than one year was justified; there is apparently no leeway under the
Lemon Law.
The Lemon Law expressly makes the manufacturer, its agent, or
authorized dealer responsible for any remedies awarded. 1 4 The inclu-
sion of the manufacturer in this provision appears to be a victory for the
consumer who has traditionally confronted the problem of privity when
suing a manufacturer for breach of warranty under the U.C.C., which
uses the term "seller" instead of "manufacturer."'8 5 In fact, however,
Oklahoma courts have already removed the privity barrier between the
Illinois Lemon Law, 1984 S. ILL. U.LJ. 1, 19-25, suggests that the broad definition of "consumer" in
the Massachusetts and Connecticut Lemon Laws (to which the Oklahoma definition is almost identi-
cal) would extend coverage to a wide range of plaintiffs.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 154-60.
177. Okla. Lemon Law § 1(B).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1982).
179. Implied warranties are recognized under OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 2-314 and 2-315 (1981).
180. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (breach of
warranty is a subset of nonconformity).
181. Okla. Lemon Law, § 1(B).
182. Id. The one-year limit for notification runs from the date of original delivery to the original
consumer. Id
183. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 2-607(3)(a), 2-608(2) (1981).
184. Okla. Lemon Law § I(B), (C).
185. See, ag., Hardesty v. Andro Corp.-Webster Div., 555 P.2d 1030 (Okla. 1976) (owner-con-
tractor of apartment complex not allowed to sue for breach of express or implied warranty by manu-
facturer of defective air conditioning chiller unit).
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buyer and the manufacturer in cases involving economic loss.'8 6 By rec-
ognizing in the Lemon Law the manufacturer's liability for breach of
warranty, the Oklahoma Legislature arguably is following the lead of the
judiciary.
The Lemon Law does affirmatively state the consumer's right to
have the obligations of the warranty met.8 7 However, its use of the
186. The Oklahoma Supreme Court abrogated the privity requirement in economic loss cases
based on breach of implied warranty in Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604
P.2d 849, 852 (1979). In Old Albany, the buyer, as the "ultimate purchaser.. . in the 'vertical'
chain of distribution," was allowed to sue the manufacturer of defective carpet for breach of implied
warranty. It is helpful to note, as the court did, that the issue in Old Albany was not judicial exten-
sion of horizontal privity under U.C.C. § 2-318 (Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1981)) as the buyer in
Hardesty had claimed, 555 P.2d at 1034, but vertical privity. According to official U.C.C. comment
3 to § 2-318 (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 2-318 official U.C.C. comment 3 (West 1963)), the Code
adopted a "neutral" position with respect to vertical privity, thus permitting judicial and legislative
expansion.
Decisions after Old Albany have held that vertical privity is no barrier to suit for breach of
implied warranty, see, eg., Perry v. Lawson Ford Tractor Co., 613 P.2d 458 (Okla. 1980) (buyer of
used combine sued dealer and manufacturer, jointly termed "seller" by the court, for breach of
implied warranty), and for breach of express warranty, see, eg., Sullivan v. Wilco Seed Co., 691 P.2d
899, 901 (Okla. 1984) (buyer sued producer of defective peanut seed for breach of implied and
express warranties); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d 739, 742 (Okla. 1981) ("requirement of vertical
privity as a prerequisite to suit on an implied or express warranty, both under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and outside the Code, is, given today's market structure, an antiquated notion."); Osburn
v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc., 613 P.2d 445, 449 n.9 (Okla. 1980) (buyer of defective motor home
recovered from manufacturer for breach of manufacturer's express warranty "to the original retail
purchaser that each new mobile home.. . shall be free from any substantial defects in material or
workmanship").
It is arguable that no privity problem existed in Osburn since the buyer held an express war-
ranty directly from the manufacturer. Cf. Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d
1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1984). In holding that Old Albany and Elden allowed the buyer in Patty
Precision to sue the manufacturer of d defective tool machine on express and implied warranties, the
court of appeals did not address the hypothetical case where a buyer sues a manufacturer who has
neither made an express warranty nor authorized the distributor's express warranty. Such a case
would seem to be based upon an implied warranty between manufacturer and buyer. It is unclear
whether the court of appeals intended to contradict the Elden abrogation of the privity requirement
for implied warranty actions.
Inasmuch as virtually all buyers of defective new automobiles receive express warranties con-
spicuously displaying the manufacturer's name, privity should not be in question. The buyer, relying
on implied warranties (for example, covering parts excluded from the express warranty) should,
however, be aware that the Tenth Circuit has not reconciled its comments in Patty Precision with
earlier Oklahoma decisions abrogating the privity requirement for suits under implied warranties.
Revocation of acceptance actions applying Oklahoma law have involved buyers and sellers and
have not raised the issue of whether lack of privity should bar an action for revocation. See CMI
Corp. v. Leemar Steel Co., 733 F.2d 1410, 1413 (10th Cir. 1984) (action by buyer against seller who
also had manufactured the nonconforming oil pump counterweight inserts); Atlan Indus., Inc. v.
O.E.M., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 184, 186 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (buyer recovered from supplier of noncon-
forming reground plastic); Oberg v. Phillips, 615 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Okla. Ct App. 1980) (buyer sued
dealer who sold nonconforming automobile). Although the issue has not been heard in Oklahoma,
by analogy to the warranty from which the revocation action will most often arise, see supra notes
83-84 and accompanying text, privity should not be a barrier to revocation.
187. Okla. Lemon Law, § 1(B).
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terms "such repairs as are necessary" 188 and "by repairing or cor-
recting"' 89 may allow the manufacturer to avoid the complete replace-
ment of a defective part which would be required under the contractual
repair or replace warranty.
The statutory refund or replacement option for an automobile under
a limited warranty certainly is a broader remedy than the U.C.C. remedy
of refund only 90 or the Magnuson-Moss refund or replacement remedy
available only under a full warranty. 9 ' The Lemon Law refund is specif-
ically defined to include, in addition to the price, taxes, license, registra-
tion fees and similar governmental fees'92 which under the U.C.C. would
have to be argued as incidental or consequential damages. Oklahoma
courts may face certain difficulties in interpreting the seemingly generous
remedies offered by the Lemon Law. First, it is not clear whether the
manufacturer or the consumer makes the choice between replacement
and refund. It has also been suggested that since the most obvious con-
struction of the law would allow an offset to the manufacturer only when
the buyer receives a refund, then the manufacturer will never offer a re-
placement, if the remedy is at the manufacturer's option.'93 The Minne-
sota Lemon Law, by contrast, specifies that the choice of remedy is "at
the consumer's option."' 94 Second, the Oklahoma Lemon Law impre-
cisely defines the replacement vehicle as "new."' 195 Other states have
narrowed the definition of a replacement with such terms as "acceptable
to the consumer"'196 and "comparable."'
197
When the lemon is returned to the manufacturer and the buyer re-
ceives a new replacement vehicle, the lemon becomes a defective used
automobile. If the Oklahoma Lemon Law is to be a thoroughly effective
consumer protection statute, the Law should require that subsequent
buyers of used lemons be alerted that these vehicles are defective. The
Oklahoma Law makes no such provision.'9
188. Id.
189. Id § 1(C.
190. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-711(1) (1981).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1982).
192. Okla. Lemon Law § I(C). A further useful clause provides that the award be made to the
consumer and the lienholder according to their interests. Id
193. Ervine, Protecting New Car Purchaser= Recent United States and English Developments
Compared, 34 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 342, 351 (1985).
194. MwNr. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(3)(a) (West Supp. 1985).
195. Okla. Lemon Law § 1().
196. CoNN. GENm. STAT. ANN. § 42-179(d) (West Supp. 1985).
197. MiNe. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665(3)(a) (West Supp. 1985). Rigg, supra note 152, at 1154-55,
suggests that even these attempts at precision leave interpretation to the courts.
198. The Connecticut Lemon Law, for example, requires "clear and conspicuous written disclo-
[Vol. 21:318
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The buyer's right to "continued use," which has been frequently dis-
puted under the U.C.C., is acknowledged and defined under the Lemon
Law. 199 Although it defines the time period for which the manufacturer
may demand an offset,2' the Lemon Law stops short of setting a formula
for calculating the offset.210
Procedurally, the Lemon Law is simpler in that it avoids the ques-
tion of whether the buyer had knowledge of the nonconformity and as-
surance that it would be cured before revoking. In other procedural
aspects, the Lemon Law refund or replace remedy is both equal to the
U.C.C. remedy of revocation and potentially more restrictive. The
Lemon Law remedy is available where a nonconformity "substantially
impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle to the consumer .. ."202
The proof problems inherent in the U.C.C. issue of substantial impair-
ment20 3 are, therefore, going to arise under the Lemon Law. Further-
more, the courts are likely to interpret the phrase "to the consumer" to
require the more demanding subjective standard of the U.C.C. for proof
of substantial impairment.2°0 Several commentators have suggested that
a lemon law such as that adopted by Oklahoma which makes lack of
substantial impairment an affirmative defense20 reduces the buyer's
prima facie case to a showing of nonconformity after reasonable repair
attempts.2 "6 It is possible under the influence of revocation of acceptance
cases that the courts will continue to require the buyer to prove substan-
tial impairment.20 7
sure of the fact that such motor vehicle was so returned prior to resale." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-179(t) (West Supp. 1985).
199. Okla. Lemon Law § 1(C). "Continued use" is prior to "the first written report of the non-
conformity... and during any subsequent period when the vehicle is not out of service by reason of
repair." Id
200. Id.
201. The Connecticut Lemon Law specifies the following formula: "reasonable allowance for
use shall be that amount obtained by multiplying the total contract price of the vehicle by a fraction
having as its denominator one hundred thousand and having as its numerator the number of miles
that the vehicle traveled prior to the manufacturer's acceptance of its return." CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 42-179(d) (West Supp. 1985). Other methods include a certain amount per mile and a per-
centage of the purchase price. Rigg, supra note 152, at 1156.
202. Okla. Lemon Law § I(C).
203. See supra notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
205. Okla. Lemon Law, § I(C).
206. McEttrick, Defective Motor Vehicles; The Massachusetts Lemon Laws and Recent Used Car
Cases Under Chapter 93A, 70 MAss. L.R. 30, 34 (1985); Note, U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV., supra note
15, at 194; Comment, "Lemon Laws" in Ohio Turn Sour for the Dealer, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 609, 639
(1984).
207. Facts relevant to proving substantial impairment by a subjective standard "are uniquely
within the owner's knowledge." Note, WAsH. U.L.Q., supra note 15, at 1155, n.164.
1985]
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The Lemon Law is more restrictive in that its definition of "reason-
able number of attempts,""0 8 while admittedly a more objective standard
than that of "seasonable" cure under the U.C.C.,209 does not offer the
margin for particular fact patterns that the U.C.C. does. Furthermore,
the Oklahoma Lemon Law requires that the four repair attempts apply
to the same nonconformity and the forty-five days out-of-service require-
ment is longer than the requirement in most other lemon laws.210
IV. CONCLUSION
Fortunately, the Oklahoma Lemon Law does not preclude damages
under a breach of warranty action or a refund after revocation of accept-
ance. For while attempting to guarantee a generous remedy to the auto-
mobile buyer, the Lemon Law as it now reads may deny to the consumer
some of the flexibility inherent in the U.C.C. In Oberg the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals has already shown itself to be sympathetic to the con-
sumer who shows adequate proof under the U.C.C. Under the Lemon
Law, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals might have ruled against Oberg.
Because Oberg's automobile had numerous defects instead of a single
nonconformity, the forty-five days out of service requirement would have
applied. The opinion states that Oberg's automobile was out of service
between thirty and forty-five days. The Court of Appeals would have
been required to deny recovery under the Oklahoma Lemon Law to a
consumer whose car had over twenty defects and had been out of service
for repairs for at least thirty days.
Nonetheless, the Oklahoma Lemon Law does hold the potential of a
replacement vehicle for the buyer holding a limited warranty, a remedy
not available under the U.C.C. or the Magnuson- Moss Act. In addi-
tion, the requirement that consumers submit to arbitration may improve
communication between buyers and manufacturers and help some buyers
to avoid litigation.
Several amendments, suggested by recent changes in the Connecti-
cut Lemon Law, would make the Oklahoma Lemon Law a strong con-
sumer protection statute. The time limits should be changed to the
period of the warranty or one year, whichever is longer, so that a trans-
feree is protected for the full period of a warranty lasting longer than one
year. The choice between a refund and a replacement vehicle should be
208. Okla. Lemon Law § 1(D).
209. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
210. Okla. Lemon Law § I(D); see Honigman, supra note 150, at 128.
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at the consumer's option. The new vehicle should be comparable to the
vehicle returned, and the standard for proving substantial impairment
and for resolving any dispute about the quality of the replacement vehicle
should be objective. The requirement of an objective standard could be
achieved by removing the qualifier "to the consumer" after the phrase
"substantially impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle" in subsec-
tion two (c). Consumers and manufacturers both will benefit from this
less stringent objective standard of proof. The forty-five days out of ser-
vice requirement should be reduced to thirty days. Finally, the Legisla-
ture should mandate certification of manufacturers' dispute resolution
procedures in order to inspire consumer confidence in and manufacturer
support of such programs.
Jeanne Rehberg
30









AN ACT RELATING TO CONTRACTS; DEFINING TERMS;
REQUIRING MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURER, AGENT
OR DEALER TO MAKE REPAIRS UNDER WARRANTIES; RE-QUIRING MANUFACTURER TO REPLACE MOTOR VEHI-
CLE OR REFUND FULL PURCHASE PRICE UNDER
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; ALLOWING FOR CONSUMER
USE WHEN DETERMINING AMOUNT; DEFINING REASON-
ABLE ALLOWANCE FOR USE; PROVIDING FOR AFFIRMA-
TIVE DEFENSES; ESTABLISHING PRESUMPTION OF
CONFORMITY TO WARRANTIES; PROVIDING FOR NO LIM-
ITATION ON OTHER RIGHTS OR REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO
CONSUMER; REQUIRING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCE-
DURES IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDING FOR
CODIFICATION; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
OKLAHOMA:
SECTION 1.9 NEW LAW A new section of law to be codified in
the Oklahoma Statutes as Section 901 of Title 15, unless there is created
a duplication in numbering, reads as follows:
A. As used in this act:
1. "Consumer" means the purchaser, other than for purposes of
resale, of a motor vehicle, any person to whom such motor vehicle is
transferred during the duration of an express warranty applicable to such
motor vehicle, and any other person entitled by the terms of such war-
ranty to enforce the obligations of the warranty; and
2. "Motor vehicle" means any motor-driven vehicle required to be
registered under the Motor Vehicle License and Registration Act, Sec-
tions 22 et seq. of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes, excluding vehicles
above ten thousand (10,000) pounds gross vehicle weight and the living
facilities of motor homes.
B. For the purposes of this act, if a new motor vehicle does not
conform to all applicable express warranties, and the consumer reports
9. 15 O.S. Supp. 1985, § 901.
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the nonconformity, directly in writing, to the manufacturer, its agent or
its authorized dealer during the term of such express warranties or dur-
ing the period of one (1) year following the date of original delivery of the
motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever is the earlier date, the manufac-
turer, its agent or its authorized dealer shall make such repairs as are
necessary to conform the vehicle to such express warranties, notwith-
standing the fact that such repairs are made after the expiration of such
term or such one-year period.
C. If the manufacturer, or its agents or authorized dealers are un-
able to conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by
repairing or correcting any defect or condition which substantially im-
pairs the use and value of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a rea-
sonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall replace the motor
vehicle with a new motor vehicle or accept return of the vehicle from the
consumer and refund to the consumer the full purchase price including
all taxes, license, registration fees and all similar governmental fees, ex-
cluding interest, less a reasonable allowance for the consumer's use of the
vehicle. Refunds shall be made to the consumer, and lienholder if any, as
their interests may appear. A reasonable allowance for use shall be that
amount directly attributable to use by the consumer prior to his first
written report of the nonconformity to the manufacturer, agent or dealer
and during any subsequent period when the vehicle is not out of service
by reason of repair. It shall be an affirmative defense to any claim under
this act (1) that an alleged nonconformity does not substantially impair
such use and value or (2) that a nonconformity is the result of abuse,
neglect or unauthorized modifications or alterations of a motor vehicle.
In no event shall the presumption described in this subsection apply
against a manufacturer unless the manufacturer has received prior direct
written notification from or on behalf of the consumer and has had an
opportunity to cure the defect alleged.
D. It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have
been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to the applicable express
warranties, if (1) the same nonconformity has been subject to repair four
or more times by the manufacturer or its agents or authorized dealers
within the express warranty term or during the period of one (1) year
following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a con-
sumer, whichever is the earlier date, but such nonconformity continues
to exist or (2) the vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for a cumu-
lative total of forty-five (45) or more calendar days during such term or
19851
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during such period, whichever is the earlier date. The term of an express
warranty, such one-year period and such forty-five-day period shall be
extended by any period of time during which repair services are not
available to the consumer because of a war, invasion, strike or fire, flood
or other natural disaster.
E. Nothing in this act shall in any way limit the rights or remedies
which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law.
F. If a manufacturer has established an informal dispute settle-
ment procedure which complies in all respects with the provisions of Ti-
tle 16, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 703, as from time to time
amended, the provisions of subsection C of this section concerning re-
funds or replacement shall not apply to any consumer who has not first
resorted to such procedure.
SECTION 2.10 This act shall become effective November 1, 1985.
Approved July 22, 1985.
10. 15 O.S. Supp. 1985, § 901 note.
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ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.45.300 to .360 (Supp. 1984)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1261 to -1265 (Supp. 1984-85)
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1793.2 (West 1985)
COLo. REV. STAT. §§ 42-12-101 to -107 (1984)
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-179 to -184 (West Supp. 1985)
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-5009 (Supp. 1984)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 681.10-.108 (West Supp. 1985)
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 437-3.5 (Supp. 1984)
ILI. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 1201-1208 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 322E.1 (West Supp. 1985)
Act of April 23, 1985, ch. 39, 1985 Kan. Sess. Laws 257
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.1941-1946 (West Supp. 1985)
M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1161-1165 (Supp. 1984-85)
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 14-1501 (Supp. 1985) (amended 1985)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7NI/2 (West Supp. 1985)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.665 (West Supp. 1985)
MSS. CODE ANN. §§ 63-17-151 to 63-17-165 (Supp. 1985)
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.560 to .579 (Vernon Supp. 1985)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-501 to -507 (1983)
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 60-2701 to -2709 (1984)
NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 598.751-.786 (1983)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D (1984)
NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 56.12-19 to .12-28 (West Supp. 1985)
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 198-a (McKinney Supp. 1984-85)
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 646.315-.375 (1983)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 73, §§ 1951-1963 (Purdon Supp. 1985)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-5.2-1 to 31-5.2-13 (Supp. 1984)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 55-24-101 to -24-109 (Supp. 1984)
Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) § 6.07 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (held
constitutional in Chrysler Corp. v. Tex. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d
1192, reh'g denied, 761 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1985))
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4170-4181 (1984)
VA. CODE §§ 59.1-207.7 to -207.14 (Supp. 1985)
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.118.010-.118.070 (Supp. 1985-86)
W. VA. CODE §§ 46A-6A-1 to -6A-9 (Supp. 1985)
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015 (West Supp. 1985)
Wyo. STAT. 1 § 40-17-101 (Supp. 1985)
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Two other states have addressed aspects of the lemon problem without enacting the typical
refund or replace provision:
Kentucky KY. REv. STAT. §§ 367.860-.870 (Supp. 1984) (provides dispute resolution
system)
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-103(l)(d) (Supp. 1983) (ends problem of privity
under the U.C.C. by including "manufacturer of self-propelled motor
vehicles" in definition of "seller")
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